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Abstract 
 
Ad hoc wireless network with their changing topology and distributed nature are 
more prone to intruders. The network monitoring functionality should be in 
operation as long as the network exists with nil constraints. The efficiency of an 
Intrusion detection system in the case of an ad hoc network is not only determined 
by its dynamicity in monitoring but also in its flexibility in utilizing the available 
power in each of its nodes. In this paper we propose a hybrid intrusion detection 
system, based on a power level metric for potential ad hoc hosts, which is used to 
determine the duration for which a particular node can support a network-
monitoring node. Power –aware hybrid intrusion detection system focuses on the 
available power level in each of the nodes and determines the network monitors. 
Power awareness in the network results in maintaining power for network 
monitoring, with monitors changing often, since it is an iterative power-optimal 
solution to identify nodes for distributed agent-based intrusion detection. The 
advantage that this approach entails is the inherent flexibility it provides, by 
means of considering only fewer nodes for re-establishing network monitors. The 
detection of intrusions in the network is done with the help of Cellular Automata   
(CA). The CA’s classify a packet routed through the network either as normal or 
an intrusion. The use of CA’s enable in the identification of already occurred 
intrusions as well as new intrusions. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
An intrusion is defined as "any set of actions that attempt to compromise 
the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of a resource". Intrusions in wireless 
networks amount to interception, interruption, or fabrication of data transmitted 
across nodes, wherein an intruder node attempts to access unauthorized data. 
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Intrusion detection is one of key techniques behind protecting a network against 
intruders. An Intrusion Detection System is a system that tries to detect and alert 
on attempted intrusions into a system or network, where an intrusion is considered 
to be any unauthorized or unwanted activity on that system or network [2]. Ad hoc 
networks are particularly prone to such dangers, considering the dynamic and 
geographically distributed nature of the nodes. Ad hoc networks can hence be 
classified on the basis of their dynamism as minimally mobile or highly mobile. 
Thus it requires a combination of both network based intrusion detection and host 
based intrusion detection systems.  
Hybrid intrusion detection systems are inherently reconfigurable, since the 
agents can easily be migrated to other hosts, and are by themselves lightweight, 
and thus suit the power sensitive nature of networks such as wireless sensor 
networks. We adopt a hierarchical model for Intrusion Detection and extend it to 
include power awareness of individual nodes. We utilize the power level metric 
PLANE as described in [1], for comparing power levels across nodes for running 
agent-based network monitoring processes. A complete analysis of possible 
network threats to general ad-hoc networks is found in [3, 10].We adopt the 
hierarchical model proposed in [2] and, modify SPAID [1], extending it to 
provide efficient power aware solution for dynamic networks. 
 
II. Survey of Related Work 
 
Numerous detection systems have been proposed to tackle the problem of 
intrusion in wireless networks some of which are an extension of intrusion 
detection system in wired networks. Few deal with network based IDS [6] and 
few with host based IDS [7], all which are based on lightweight agents [5, 6, 7]. 
Power awareness in mobile ad hoc networks [4] becomes a major issue when 
considering intrusion detection in larger networks. 
 
2.1. Triggering Mechanisms 
 
To protect the network, IDS must generate alarms when it detects intrusive 
activity on the network. Different IDSs trigger alarms based on different types of 
network activity. 
 The two most common triggering mechanisms are the following: 
1. Anomaly detection  
2. Misuse detection  
Discussions regarding the above triggering mechanisms can be found in [3]. 
Besides implementing a triggering mechanism, the IDS must somehow watch for 
intrusive activity at specific points within the network. Monitoring intrusive 
activity normally occurs at the following two locations: 
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1. Host – Host based IDS 
2. Network – Network based IDS 
Finally, many intrusion detection systems incorporate multiple features into a 
single system. These systems are known as hybrid systems. These hybrid 
intrusion detection systems having their architecture based on agents [2, 9] which 
travel throughout the network, provide a comprehensive solution. 
 
2.2. Host-Based IDS (HIDS)  
 
Host-based systems, the first type of IDS to be developed and 
implemented, collect and analyze data that originate on a computer that hosts a 
service, such as a Web server. Once this data is aggregated for a given computer, 
it can either be analyzed locally or sent to a separate/central analysis machine. 
One example of a host-based system is programs that operate on a system and 
receive application or operating system audit logs. These programs are highly 
effective for detecting insider abuses. Residing on the trusted network systems 
themselves, they are close to the network’s authenticated users. If one of these 
users attempts unauthorized activity, host-based systems usually detect and collect 
the most pertinent information in the quickest possible manner. In addition to 
detecting unauthorized insider activity, host-based systems are also effective at 
detecting unauthorized file modification. Host-based commercial products include 
ITA, Squire, and Entercept, to name a few.  
 
2.3. Network-Based IDS (NIDS)  
 
Network-based intrusion detection analyzes data packets that travel over 
the actual network. These packets are examined and sometimes compared with 
empirical data to verify their nature: malicious or benign. Because they are 
responsible for monitoring a network, rather than a single host, Network-based 
intrusion detection systems (NIDS) tend to be more distributed than host-based 
IDS. Software, or appliance hardware in some cases, resides in one or more 
systems connected to a network, and is used to analyze data such as network 
packets. Instead of analyzing information that originates and resides on a 
computer, network-based IDS uses techniques like “packet-sniffing” to pull data 
from TCP/IP or other protocol packets traveling along the network. Examples of 
network-based IDS include Shadow, Snort, Dragon, NFR, RealSecure, and 
NetProwler.  
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2.4. Hybrid Intrusion Detection System 
 
The two types of intrusion detection systems differ significantly from each 
other, but complement one another well. The network architecture of host-based 
is agent-based, which means that a software agent resides on each of the hosts that 
will be governed by the system. In addition, more efficient host-based intrusion 
detection systems are capable of monitoring and collecting system audit trails in  
 
Fig.1. Hybrid Intrusion Detection System 
 
real time as well as on a scheduled basis, thus distributing both CPU utilization 
and network overhead and providing for a flexible means of security 
administration.               
In a proper IDS implementation, it would be advantageous to fully 
integrate the network intrusion detection system, such that it would filter alerts 
and notifications in an identical manner to the host-based portion of the system, 
controlled from the same central location (Fig.1). In doing so, this provides a 
convenient means of managing and reacting to misuse using both types of 
intrusion detection.  
Although network intrusion detection has its merits and certainly must be 
incorporated into a proper IDS solution, it has historically been incapable of 
evolving to comply with the growing technology of data communications. Most 
NIDS perform miserably, if at all, on switched networks, fast networks of speeds 
over 100 Mbps, and encrypted networks. Furthermore, somewhere in the range of 
80 - 85 percent of security incidents originate from within an organization. 
Consequently, intrusion detection systems should rely predominantly on host-
based components, but should always make use of NIDS to complete the defense.  
In short, a truly secure environment requires both a network and host-based 
intrusion detection implementation to provide for a robust system that is the basis 
for all of the monitoring, response, and detection of computer misuse.  
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2.5. Power-aware Design: 
 
Energy-aware design and evaluation of network protocols requires 
knowledge of the energy consumption behavior of actual wireless interfaces. But 
little practical information is available about the energy consumption behavior of 
well-known wireless network interfaces and device specifications do not provide 
information in a form that is helpful to protocol developers [1]. 
Wireless devices must operate for a long period of time, relying on their 
battery power. Although many developers have looked at extending the life of a 
wireless system from a hardware point of view, such as directional antennas and 
improving battery life, power-awareness is a relatively new concept in wireless 
networking [2]. The metrics that have so far been devised to minimize power can 
be grouped into two main categories, power-aware and cost-aware metrics. 
Power-aware metrics aim to minimize the total power needed for intrusion 
detection when a packet is routed through a network while cost-aware metrics 
look at methods which extend the nodes’ battery lifetime.  
  Because mobile devices are dependent on battery power, it is important to 
minimize their energy consumption. The energy consumption of the network 
interface can be significant, especially for smaller devices. Most research in 
energy conservation strategies has targeted wireless networks that are structured 
around base stations and centralized servers, which do not have the limitations 
associated with small, portable devices. By contrast, an ad hoc network is a group 
of mobile, wireless hosts which cooperatively form a network independently of 
any fixed infrastructure. The multi-hop routing problem in ad hoc networks has 
been widely studied in terms of bandwidth utilization, but energy consumption 
has received less attention [12]. So has it in intrusion detection. It is sometimes 
(incorrectly) assumed that bandwidth utilization and energy consumption are 
roughly synonymous. Recent studies are that of energy-aware ad hoc routing 
protocols, particularly for distributed sensor networks. In this context, energy is 
often treated as an abstract “commodity” for purposes of minimizing cost or 
maximizing time to network partition. 
We believe that energy-aware design and evaluation of network protocols 
for the ad hoc networking environment requires practical knowledge of the energy 
consumption behavior of actual wireless devices [4]. In addition, it is important to 
present this information in a form that is useful to protocol developers: the total 
energy costs associated with a packet containing some number of bytes of data. 
Device specifications, which indicate the current draw while transmitting and 
receiving, are somewhat unhelpful in this respect. 
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III. PHIDS & Cellular Automata (CA)  
 
Cellular automata use localized structures to solve problems in an 
evolutionary way. CA often demonstrates also significant ability toward self-
organization that comes mostly from the localized structure on which they operate. 
By organization, one means that after some time in the evolutionary process, the 
system exhibits more or less stable localized structures (Wolfram, 2002). This 
behavior can be found no matter the initial conditions of the automaton. 
  
 A CA[4-6], consists of a number of cells organized in the form of a lattice. It 
evolves in discrete space and time. The next state of a cell depends on its own 
state and the states of its neighboring cells. In a 3-neighborhood dependency, the 
next state qi (t + 1) of a cell is assumed to be dependent only on itself and on its 
two neighbors (left and right) and is denoted as: 
 
 qi(t + 1) = f (qi−1(t), qi(t), qi+1(t)) (1) 
 
where, qi (t) represents the state of the ith cell at tth instant of time, f is the next 
state function and referred to as the rule of the automata. The decimal equivalent 
of the next state function, as introduced by Wolfram, is the  rule  number  of  the  
CA  cell[8].  
 
3.1 Fuzzy CA fundamentals: FCA[2,6] is a linear array of cells which evolves in 
time. Each cell of the array assumes a state qi, a rational value in the interval [0,1] 
(fuzzy states) and changes its state according to a local evolution function on its 
own state and the states of its two neighbors. The degree to which a cell is in 
fuzzy states 1 and 0 can be calculated with the membership functions. This gives 
more accuracy in finding the coding regions. In a FCA, the conventional Boolean 
functions are AND, OR, NOT.  
Dependency matrix for FCA: Rules defined in Eq. 1  should be represented as a 
local transition function of FCA cell. That rules (Table 1) are converted into 
matrix form for easier representation of chromosomes.  
 
Example 1: A 4-cell null boundary hybrid FCA with the following rule <238, 
254, 238, 252> (that is, <(qi+qi+1), (qi−1+qi+qi+1), (qi+qi+1), (qi−1+qi)>) 
applied from left to right, may be characterized by the following dependency 
matrix. 
 While moving from one state to other, the dependency matrix indicates on 
which neighboring cells the state should depend. So cell 254 depends on its state, 
left neighbor and right neighbor . Now we represented the transition function in 
the form of matrix. In the case of complement[5,6,8], FCA we use another vector 
for representation of chromosome. 
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Table 1: Rule of  FCA 
 
Non-complemented rules Complemented rules 
------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------- 
Rule Next state Rule Next state 
0 0 255 1 
170 qi+1 85 qi 1+  
204 qi 51 qi  
238 qi+qi+1 17 qi qi 1+ +  
240 qi-1 15 qi 1−  
250 qi-1+qi+1 5 qi 1 qi 1− + +  
252 qi-1+qi 3 qi 1 qi− +  
 
 
 
1 1 0 0
1 1 1 0
T
0 0 1 1
0 0 1 1
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  
 
                         Fig 2: Matrix Representation of Rule 
 
 
3.2 Challenges of any Network Based Intrusion System 
 
 
The cost of ownership should be lower for an enterprise environment. 
Network-based IDS must examine all packet headers for signs of malicious and 
suspicious activity. They have to use live network traffic for real-time attack 
detection. Therefore, an attacker cannot remove the evidence. They also detect 
malicious and suspicious attacks as they occur, and so provide faster notification 
and response.  These are not dependent on host operating systems as detection 
sources. Network-based IDS add valuable data for determining malicious intent. 
 
3.3 Genetic Algorithm & CA  
 
The main motivation behind the evolving cellular automata framework is 
to understand how genetic algorithms evolve cellular automata that perform 
computational tasks requiring global information processing, since the individual 
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cells in a CA can communicate only locally  without the existence of a central 
control  the GA has to evolve CA that exhibit higher-level emergent behavior in 
order to perform this global information processing .Thus this framework 
provides an approach to studying how evolution can create dynamical systems in 
which the interactions of simple components with local information storage and 
communication give rise to coordinated global information processing. 
 
3.4 Crossover and Mutation 
 
Traditional genetic algorithms have been used to identify and converge 
populations of candidate hypotheses to a single global optimum. For this problem, 
a set of rules is needed as a basis for the IDS. There is no way to clearly identity 
whether a network connection is normal or anomalous just using one rule. 
Multiple rules are needed to identify unrelated anomalies, which means that 
several good rules are more effective than a single best rule. Another reason for 
finding multiple rules is that because there are so many network connection 
possibilities. The sharing method reduces the fitness of individuals that have 
highly similar members and forces individuals to evolve to other local maxima 
that may be less populated. The similarity metrics used in these techniques can be 
phenotype to genotype similarity such as Hamming distance between bit 
representations, or phenotype similarity such as the relation between two network 
connections in this problem. The latter one is more fitful for finding rules used in 
IDS. The disadvantage of this approach is that it requires more domain-specific 
knowledge The mutation operation should be meaningful during evolution. For 
example, each segment of the IP address should not exceed 255 (decimal 
representation). Mutations should be done following the requirements specified in 
Table 1. These limitations can be enforced by defining proper mutation rules. 
 
 
3.5  CA frame work for Intrusion 
 
A computational task T for a CA is now defined as a mapping from initial 
configurations s0 to sets of answer states Ai,(1<= i <=N) for finite n. An answer 
state Ai consisting of finite set of m configurations sj (1<= j <=N) which is time 
invariant which the CA must cycle repeatedly as show in equation 1. 
 
{ }NiAiT N <<→=∑ 1:       - (2) 
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3.6 CA Key Distribution  
 
NIDSWCA depends on public key servers when using public key 
cryptography. To simply the design and reduce the load on the endpoints running 
NIDSWCA, a centralized, trusted Key Distribution Center (KDC) is used in our 
design. Since NIDSWCA hosts communicate through multicast, potentially every 
host on the trusted network will get messages addressed to the NIDSWCA group, 
which it will have to subsequently validate against the sender’s public key. This 
imposes heavy and bursty load on the KDC. 
 
At a theoretical level, cellular automaton Intrusion detection models can 
be analyzed by much the same methods of statistical mechanics as have been used 
in trying to derive the Navier-Stokes equations for physical fluids from the 
microscopic dynamics of real molecules. Fig2 show the Design of CA based 
Intrusion Detection. The resulting equations for these macroscopic quantities 
correspond closely with the usual Navier-Stokes equations. Just like a real fluid, 
however, the cellular automaton model contains definite higher-order corrections, 
not included in the Navier-Stokes equations. In addition, analytical methods 
provide only approximate values for parameters such as viscosity; accurate values 
must be obtained from explicit computer simulations. 
  
 
3.7  Basic Algorithm 
 
CA Tree Building (Assuming K CA Basins) 
 
Input:    Intrusion parameters (constraints) 
Output: CA Based  inverted tree  
Step 0: Start. 
Step 1: Generate a CA with k number of CA basins 
Step 2: Distribute the parameters into k CA basins 
Step 3: Evaluate the distribution in each closet basin 
Step 4: Calculate the Rq( Malicious Index) 
Step 5: Swap the more appropriate features to the bottom leaves of the inverted 
tree. 
Step 6: Stop. 
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3.8 CA Agent System  
 
 
Fig 3 :  IDS Agent System 
 
The main feature which is achieved when developing CA Agent 
systems(fig 3), if they work, is flexibility, since a CA Agent system can be added 
to, modified and reconstructed, without the need for detailed rewriting of the 
application. These systems also tend to be rapidly self-recovering and failure 
proof, usually due to the heavy redundancy of components and the self managed. 
 
 
 
The agent-based model proposed in [10] approaches the IDS problem with 
a technique that handles intrusions with an agent running on each system. Further, 
the model in [10] is not suitable for a power-aware IDS , since such a system 
warrants energy consumption in systems irrespective of their current battery 
levels, i.e. it suggests an IDS without considering the feasibility of the assumption 
that network monitoring and analysis is justified in nodes with minimal power, 
such as robust wireless sensor networks (WSN). 
 
3.9 Modular IDS Architecture 
 
The IDS we consider is built on a mobile agent framework as in [1]. It is a 
non-monolithic system and employs several sensor agents that perform certain 
functions, such as: 
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• Network monitoring: Only certain nodes will have sensor agents for 
network packet monitoring, since we are interested in preserving the total 
computational power and battery power of mobile hosts. 
• Host monitoring: Every node on the mobile ad hoc network will be 
monitored internally by a host-monitoring agent. This includes monitoring 
system-level and application-level activities.  
• Decision-making: Every node will decide the intrusion threat level on a 
host-level basis. Certain nodes will collect intrusion information and make 
collective decisions about network level intrusions. 
• Action: Every node will have an action module that is responsible for 
resolving intrusion situation on a host (such as locking out a node, killing a 
process, etc). 
A hierarchy of agents has been devised in order to achieve the above goals. 
We will adapt the hierarchy for our purposes. There are three major agent classes 
as used in [2], categorized as monitoring, decision-making and action agents. 
Some are present on all mobile hosts, while others are distributed to only a select 
group of nodes, as discussed further. The monitoring agent class consists of 
packet, user, and system monitoring agents. The following diagram shows the 
hierarchy of agent classes. 
 
 
Fig.4.Typical agent hierarchy, depicting the multi-level decision 
making process for intrusion detection 
 
A detailed discussion of each of the modules and its functionalities can be found 
in [2]. 
3.10 Agent Distribution 
 
As a modification over the previous approach for agent distribution [1], 
the nodes on a wireless ad-hoc network, that are elected as network monitors will 
include the action and decision making modules. To save resources, some of the 
functionality must be distributed efficiently to a (small) number of nodes. The 
decision making module incorporates the energy metric Power Loss/Availability 
for Network-monitoring Estimate (PLANE), a node-specific measure of the mean 
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power loss per node for running the network monitoring agent. PLANE can 
directly be related to the wireless protocol used, mean number of wireless links 
for the specific node, average node maintenance energy consumption, and the 
battery power remaining. PLANE ultimately estimates the duration the node can 
last on the same power without replenishment. To calculate the power 
consumption metrics such as those in are often used. The reception costs are 
multiplied by the number of links for the node to yield an average reception cost, 
to which we add the average cost of sending a message. Thus, these costs are 
dependent on the density of the network and the routing/link exchange protocols 
used. 
 
3.11 Calculating PLANE 
 
The calculation of PLANE involves calculating the duration for which the 
node can continue to support a network monitor along with its normal operations. 
We therefore calculate PLANE by calculating the time for which node can last as 
the network monitoring node as shown below in Equation 1. 
 
 
In Equation 1, BPR is the total Battery Power Remaining at the instant of node 
selection and TECnm is the Total Energy Consumption with network monitoring 
node processes running. In the absence of measurement of exact networking 
monitoring energy consumption, we assume PLANE as PLANE’. The value 
PLANE’ is typically available directly from most distributed wireless networks, 
such as sensor networks, and hence finds a presence in the above calculation. 
 
 
TEC is the total energy consumption before the node is selected for network 
monitoring. PLANE can be tailored to suit the needs of the type of network 
monitoring required and the nature of the actual node on which it runs. TEC 
values are represented by different wireless nodes running in different ad hoc 
modes which consume between 741 mW and 843 mW. 
 
3.12 The PHIDS Algorithm 
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In PHIDS, we deal with multi-hop network monitoring clustered node 
selection, similar to SPAID. This type of a node selection has its inherent 
advantages in allowing complete coverage of all nodes and links in a network, but 
with an added factor of redundancy in the collection of intrusion detection data. 
The algorithm presented here is a power efficient variation over the previous 
SPAID, where the increment in hop radius and re-running of SPAID was 
considered for the whole topology, after a particular drop in power for certain 
monitoring nodes.  
This approach considers each of the initially allocated monitors and the 
nodes they monitor to be a single tree, with the monitoring node as a root and the 
nodes being monitored as its child. The root along with its child nodes contribute 
to individual clusters. Thus the whole large topology gets divided to tree 
structured clusters only for intrusion detection purpose. Thus once a node is 
selected and allotted as a monitor initially for a set of nodes, they form an 
individual cluster. 
After such clusters are established, when any drain in power levels take 
place to the monitors, any other child node with higher battery power for 
monitoring can take charge of that cluster. Since only certain clusters are active 
for certain period of time, it is enough if their root nodes i.e., their monitoring 
nodes get re-arranged (within the cluster), instead of running the whole node 
selection process as in the case of SPAID which is inefficient. 
The node selection process should be done for a network as a whole only 
when no single node within a cluster is competent enough to monitor or when a 
new node with higher PLANE value enters the existing network.   
The PHIDS algorithm uses the agent hierarchy presented in Fig.2, with a 
significantly adapted node selection mechanism to incorporate power-awareness, 
and is best detailed by the following eight steps. 
Step 1: Set PLANE threshold. Set a constraint on the PLANE value of 
nodes which are allowed to compete for becoming a network monitoring 
node.  
Step 2: PLANE Calculation and PLANE Ordered List (POL). Arrange the 
different nodes in increasing values of PLANE as calculated previously, 
for all nodes which satisfy the PLANE Constraint.  
Step 3: Hop Radius. Set the hop radius to one initially, and increment for 
each insufficient node selection with the current hop radius. 
Step 4: Expand Working Set of Nodes. Consider node selection 
incrementally, initially from the first node, (node with highest PLANE), to 
finally the set of all nodes in the network, incrementing the set of nodes 
under consideration by one node each time. We call this set the working 
set (WS) of nodes. The WS is expanded only if the addition leads to an 
increase in number of represented nodes. 
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Step 5: Voting. The voting scheme for Node Selection, is similar to that in 
[2], except that we limit the candidates to just the nodes which are part of 
WS.  
Step 6: Check acceptability of nodes. If all links/nodes are not represented 
by the set of nodes covered by the voting scheme, then we expand the WS 
and repeat the process from Step 4. If WS equals the POL, then increment 
the hop radius, and repeat from Step 3. It is suggested that the increment in 
hop radius be considered a final resort, as it effectively increases the 
amount of processing per monitoring node. 
Step 7: Cluster Setup. Set individual clusters with the nodes in the 
working set as root and the nodes being monitored by it as child nodes. 
Step 8:   Re-run. Changes in power levels of the root nodes in each cluster 
will be signaled to the child and the vote count as in step 5 takes place 
within the cluster to form a new monitoring node. 
 
 Steps 1 to 6 are similar to that of SPAID but are suitable even to highly 
mobile networks, since decision making module does not rest with very few 
nodes and only clusters are altered on each addition of a new node. 
 
3.13 An Example 
 
 Consider an ad hoc network with 9 nodes and their PLANE values as 
given below.  
 
Node 1 : 5.5  Node 6   : 4.1 
Node 2 : 7.2  Node 7   : 7.5 
Node 3 : 9.0   Node 8   : 5.7 
Node 4 : 8.5  Node 9   : 7.0 
Node 5 : 5.0  
                  
 
 
Fig.5. An example network  
             
2 
1 1
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Fig.6. Example 1 with WS = {3}                     Fig.7. Example 1 with WS = {3, 4} 
 
 
 
1
2
3
  Candidate Node     Representative Node 
 
Fig.8. Example 1 with WS = {3, 4, 7} Final Selection 
 
As shown from Fig 3 to Fig 6, the node selection algorithm mentioned above 
considers the power availability of each of the nodes in the network. The working 
set {3, 4, 7} are the monitors and they form the cluster heads. The dotted lines 
represent the monitoring function that they perform using agents. Take for 
example Fig.4., node 3 is the monitor, detecting intrusions over 1 and 2, thus 
forming a cluster  represented by the circle. 
 Step 8 of the algorithm proves to provide an energy efficient solution 
whenever one or two clusters actively participate in transmitting, receiving and 
routing. Variation in power levels take place much more in those nodes than those 
of any other clusters. It is sufficient enough to change the monitoring node only in 
those clusters instead of troubling the whole setup. Supposing cluster 1 with root 
3 is constantly participating in routing, the power level will significantly decrease 
in 3, since it has to monitor the packets transmitted across it and its child for 
intrusions. At one point of time the BPR of node 3 may drop below that of node 2. 
Thus the rearrangement within the cluster takes place, with node 2 becoming the 
root i.e. the monitor and node 3 and 1 become its children, as shown below. 
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Fig.9. Example 1 with WS = {3, 4, 7} with Cluster 1 Re-established 
 
On constant participation in the network activities, if all the nodes in a particular 
cluster, lose their power below the threshold, then a re-run of the entire node 
selection algorithm can be done. Since a new node can enter anytime into the 
existing network, the node selection algorithm should be employed to find out the 
network monitors. 
 
IV. Intrusion Detection Module using CA: 
 
Cellular Automata  s (CA’s) represent a generalized linear classifier that 
looks for the maximum margin hyper plane between two classes in the feature 
space i.e. the CA’s try to find a hyper plane between two classes which 
maximizes the minimum distance between the hyper plane and the data points. 
 
Maximum Margin Hyperplane 
 
The optimal position of the class boundary is obtained as a linear 
combination of some training samples that are placed near the boundary itself, 
and are called Cellular Automata s.  
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Fig 10: CA as a Linear Classifier
Maximum Margin 
 Hyper plane 
  Denotes +1 class 
Denotes -1 class 
Other hyper 
planes  
Cellular 
Automata 
 
   
 
 
The hyper planes are defined by the linear set of equations given by: 
 
 
 
Each input x is subject to the decision function O(x): 
 
O(x) = sign (w.x +b) 
       
 
+1 if w.x + b >= 1 
 
-1   if w.x + b <= -1 
O(x) x y = 
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The margin width of the hyper plane is computed by considering the plus 
plane and minus plane 
 
Plus plane    = {x: w.x +b = +1}  
Minus plane = {x: w.x +b = -1}       
 
 
              
 
Margin Width M 
Plus Plane 
Classifier 
Boundary 
Minus Plane 
 
Fig 11:  Margin Width of the CA Classifier 
 
 
The perpendicular distance of each of the plus and the minus planes 
respectively from the classifier boundary are given     and 
.Hence the margin width is     and the pair 
of hyper planes that gives the maximum margin can be found by minimizing 
w2..This is a quadratic programming (QP) problem. It is solved by LaGrange 
Formulation of the margin width equation. We have seen an overview of how to 
use CA for binary classification purpose.  
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Fig 12.Flow of Controls in Intrusion Detection using Cellular Automata  s 
 
 
DETAILS OF ALGORITHM 
 
There are two phases to the implementation of classification problem using CA’s. 
They are the 
 
• Training or Learning phase 
• Testing or Recognition phase 
 
A detailed description of the algorithm is shown in the figure below. It has the 
two phases-training phase and testing. 
 
 
 
Training or Learning phase 
 
 
In the training phase the optimal hyper planes for each of the binary classifiers are 
constructed based on the training set data. The system is trained with a lot of 
sample intrusions and their attributes. These images form the basis in identifying 
the image the user queries. The attribute vector for each of these intrusions is 
found and is stored in a feature database.  
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Training Phase     Testing Phase 
 
 
 
Populate the intrusion 
database with sample 
intrusions and their attributes 
Build 2 CA‘s as there are 2 
classes namely intrusion class 
and normal class 
If any CA is able to classify 
the intrusion then intrusion 
prevention steps are to be 
taken 
The query intrusion is added 
to the intrusion database  
The attribute vector for that 
case is calculated and given 
as input to each of the 2 CA‘s 
Classify all the intrusions in the 
database into one intrusion 
class 
Calculate the attribute vector 
for each of the intrusions & 
store it in a feature database 
An attribute is used to query 
the system 
Train each of the CA‘s to identify 
their class by estimating the 
optimal hyperplane for each CA 
The instances belonging to a similar class are grouped into a single category. 
There are 2 classes namely INTRUSION class and NORMAL class, therefore 
build 2 CA’s. Each CA is trained to identify its class by estimating its optimal 
hyperplane for each CA.  
 
 Testing or Recognition phase  
    
In the testing phase the attributes of the instance are used to query. The attribute 
vector is calculated for the image and is given as input to the pool of trained CA’s 
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which identifies the class to which the instance belongs and takes the necessary 
steps.  
 
 
V.  Experimental Results & Performance Comparison: 
 
 Evaluating the extended algorithm, PHIDS, in terms of power, results in 
much better utilization of the available power.   
 
 Power Utilisation
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Fig.13. Performance Comparison – SPAID vs. PHIDS 
 
Splitting up of larger networks to clusters and manipulating power levels and 
thresholds within them provides a power optimal solution than that of SPAID, 
which requires the entire network. Also SPAID [1] was considered only for 
minimally mobile networks with increments in hop radius for more dense 
networks, while PHIDS with tree based clusters can prove efficient even in the 
case of dynamic networks. 
 
Each data point is described by 41 features. Note that some attributes are 
continuous and some are nominal. Since the clustering and classification 
algorithms require continuous values, these nominal values will be first converted 
to continuous. Table 2,3,4 shows that NIDSWCA consumes less time for training . 
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Table 2: Results for Un Supervised CA with network 1 
 
Algorithm Adaptive 
Learning 
Rate 
Resilient 
Back 
propagating
Unsupervised 
CA  
Train Accuracy 40.3% 76% 89% 
Test Accuracy 24% 56% 80% 
Performance 0.33 0.004 0.5 
Time to train 60 mins 65 mins 50 mins 
 
 
Table 3:  Results for UN Supervised CA with network 2 
 
 
Algorithm Adaptive 
Learning 
Rate 
Resilient 
Back 
propagating
Unsupervised 
CA  
Train Accuracy 40.3% 76% 89% 
Test Accuracy 24% 56% 80% 
Performance 0.33 0.004 0.5 
Time to train 60 mins 65 mins 50 mins 
 
 
Table 4 Results for Un Supervised CA with network 
 
 
 
Algorithm Adaptive 
Learning 
Rate 
Resilient 
Back 
propagating
Unsupervi
sed CA  
Train Accuracy 40.3% 76% 89% 
Test Accuracy 24% 56% 80% 
Performance 0.33 0.004 0.5 
Time to train 60 mins 65 mins 50 mins 
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Fig 14: Vulnerable Edges VS Host Infected 
 
 
Fig 4 shows the graphs which takes the parameter G s( Average number of 
independent monitors) and depicts the vulnerable hosts percentage of effecting. A 
CA IDS monitors host and server event/sys logs from multiple sources for 
suspicious activity.  Host IDS are best placed to detect computer misuse from 
trusted insiders and those who have already infiltrated your network.  Okay, 
IMHO what I have just described is an event log manager, a true Host IDS will 
apply some signature analysis across multiple events/logs and/or time, 
heuristically profiling is another useful way to spot nefarious activity.  
 
The algorithm was trained with the first data set. Then we tested the 
trained algorithm (4. 3) with the same data set and got the following results. We 
have developed three classifier for dealing the problem of intrusion. Fig 5, 6, 7 
depicts the findings. 
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Fig 15: Intrusion Detection Vs Positive Rate in   Sample Network 
 
 
Classifier II,(ID) in Sample Network
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       Fig1 6: Intrusion Detection Vs Positive Rate in   Sample Network 
 
 
 
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on COMPUTER
P. KIRAN SREE,I Ramesh Babu,J.V.R.Murty 
R.Ramachandran, N.S.S.S.N Usha Devi
ISSN: 1109-2750 1871 Issue 11, Volume 7, November 2008 
         
Classifier III,(ID
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
1 2
Positi
%
 In
tru
si
on
 D
et
ec
tio
n
) in Sample Network
3 4 5 6
ve Rate
Probe
DoS
R2L
NIDSWCA
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           Fig 17: Intrusion    Detection Vs Positive Rate in   Sample Network 
 
 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper, sufficient base has been provided to understand the efficient 
functioning of the PHIDS Algorithm in determining the duration for which a node 
can support a network monitoring function in wireless ad hoc networks. The 
preliminary results show that the PHIDS Algorithm gives good results on sparse 
as well as dense mobile networks. As it is evident from the power utilization 
performance evaluation the PHIDS algorithm proves to be scalable and even more 
efficient as the number of nodes increases i.e. as the size of the wireless ad hoc 
network increases. Re-run over the entire network for node selection needs to be 
done often only with changing network topologies. 
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